Such a resolution is not binding in international law, but its prospects have elicited negative reactions from Israel, the US and part of the international community that deplore the Palestinian unilateral approach and fear the consequences of a UN resolution. Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak even warned of an impending "diplomatic tsunami".
Those fears are greatly exaggerated. The UN lacks legitimacy. It is a morally bankrupt institution, giving equal voice to the worst aggressors and human rights offenders. It is unclear how a resolution at the UN, a powerless institution, could make a dent in a century-old ethnic conflict in the Holy Land. What can it do to implement the General Assembly recommendations? The only consequence is negative, reinforcing Palestinian intransigence.
Unfortunately, General Assembly resolutions cannot fix a Palestinian national movement that is hopelessly fractured and dysfunctional.
The UN cannot turn the Palestinian factions into one political entity. Can the UN bring Gaza and the West Bank together to present reasonable interlocutors for Israeli negotiators? Can it mellow Hamas's lust to kill Jews and to eradicate Israel? Can it eradicate the "shaheed" death culture?
Is the UN in a position to infuse pragmatism into Palestinian political culture?
The Palestinians insist on the invented "right of return" for Palestinian refugees, which most of the world sees as an unrealistic demand and an obstacle to peace. The Palestinians are trying to deny Jewish history in Jerusalem. They are still not ready to concede that they lost the struggle over Jerusalem, a united capital city that the Jews will adamantly defend. Israel is unquestionably stronger and time is on its side. Nevertheless, the Palestinians remain "bad losers", not willing to make a pragmatic deal in order to achieve statehood.
The UN cannot deliver a state. It can change neither the facts nor Palestinian behaviour. The Palestinians had two historic opportunities to build a state, in 1948 and in 1993, but both were squandered by terrible leadership. Recently, we have observed somewhat more successful efforts at state-building by Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. While he is arguably the best thing that has happened to the Palestinians in their short history, his popularity among his people is quite low, indicating the dysfunctional character of Palestinian politics. The image of a booming Ramallah, the fruit of Fayyad's efforts, is somewhat misleading.
Can the PA survive without begging for international support every few months? Can it cut down its bloated and corrupt bureaucracy to enable it to build a healthy economy?
The much lauded US-trained Palestinian troops have yet to meet the real test in the main mission of state-building: monopoly over the use of force.
Illegal weapons abound, posing an extraordinary domestic security challenge. Can these troops be trusted to fight a serious challenge from Hamas or will we see them collapse just as an earlier version of US-trained Palestinian troops did in Gaza?
Actually, it is regular Israeli military incursions against the Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank that keeps the PA safe. Were Israel to take a decision to deny access to its labour market and cease money transfers and many services, the result could be lethal.
The PLO leadership realises that its options against Israel are limited and that another terrorist campaign would be extremely destructive to the Palestinians.
The power differential between a democratic, prosperous and militarily strong Israel and corrupt, autocratic and fragmented Palestinian entities is only growing.
Israel won the first two intifadas and can do so again. It is preparing for Palestinian non-violent actions that could affect its image abroad and at home. Adequate planning and training might minimise the inevitable damage resulting from clashes between soldiers and civilians.
The main challenge to Israel is, however, not on the diplomatic front, where it is doing better than its critics think. The Arab world, in the throes of a socio-political crisis, is hardly able to do anything but pay lip-service in support of a Palestinian state. Israel's diplomats managed to prevent an international flotilla from breaking the Gaza naval siege. Israel has also been successful in procuring international understanding for its demand to be recognised by the Palestinians as a Jewish state. Furthermore, Washington is solidly behind Jerusalem on most issues, while the strategic relationship is hardly affected by differences on peace negotiations.
What is at stake, however, is Israel's cohesion. A united Israel behind a government perceived as doing enough for securing peace can sustain protracted conflict. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's stable government meets these requirements. A huge number of Israelis strongly believe that the Palestinians are not ready to make the necessary concessions for peace. A UN resolution is unlikely to change public opinion in Israel, which regards this body as incompetent and hostile.
The upheaval in the Arab world indicates there is greater need for caution. Unless we see the emergence of a more pragmatic Palestinian leadership, the conflict will continue.
Efraim Inbar is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies. This article first appeared on bitterlemons.org
