Looming Near Eastern crisis

In the region there is a common understanding that may be summarized by the following adage: The road to Beirut goes through Damascus. Since the 1980s the political situation ofLebanon has in fact been closely linked to the mood of the Syrian regime and its Lebanese supporters.

The current state of affairs gives the full meaning to this maxim. While the revolutions that took place in Tunisia and Egypt greatly changed the local and regional political balance, they did not result in direct widespread violence. On the other hand, the Syrian uprising has gone through all the textbook phases leading to a full blown civil war engaging diverging international interests.

This situation is not only grave for its toll on the Syrian population but also represents a major threat to the current weak equilibrium which has guaranteed a fragile peace since 2006. If the fall of the present form of government in Damascus may no longer be doubted, the time and the shape of its demise are likely to bring about strategic shifts in its neighboring countries.

When analyzing the Syrian uprising, a major issue is the lack of cohesion of the different opposing parties present on the field. If the Syrian National Council was formed to coordinate political efforts inside and outside the country to gain and maintain unity and support, the body is now openly challenged by an increasing number of factions with competing interests.

If the jihadi presence in Syria should not be overblown, the existence of foreign fighters, mainly from Libya, Chechnya and Gulf countries, is reshaping the nature of the conflict. The growing challenge posed to the regime by former Syrian insurgents who participated in urban combats in Iraq is also causing the multiplication of the centers of power in a war torn country.

The reality today is that the Syrian uprising can no longer be considered as led by a single opposition against the Bashar Assad regime; it has to be seen as a number of loosely coordinated, if not competing one against the other, opposition movements acting inside the country. Along with that, the strategy chosen by the Free Syrian Army may be equated to some extent to the Vietnamese Tet offensive of 1968. Major battles are not being won on the ground by small unit actions.

The regular army possesses superior fire power and materiel. It is through a low intensity warfare based on attrition and through the creation of safe havens that the FSA and its partners plan to overthrow the regime. A strategy which is costly and is likely to create a long term impasse which may well be the synonym of a major regional spillover.

Winds of war

Along with a possible stalemate in Syria, a Near Eastern implosion may be characterized by the international inaction toward the issue. The United States and European powers are especially shy over taking the lead of a crisis they do not fully grasp. Small scale weapon supplies, unofficial rumors of tactical support and a cacophony of politically motivated statements do not provide any long term solution for “the day after.” If Assad were to fall today, it appears that neither the US nor the EU has prepared a contingency plan which would prevent the region from falling into deeper troubles.

Analysts in the US are focusing on the short term implications of a prolonged civil war in Syria, mainly in relation to its positive effects in blocking the Iranians expansionist policies. There is nevertheless a complete lack of evaluation of the tangible jihadi and Salafi threat posed by sizeable parts of the Syrian oppositions. If these elements do remain only a fraction of the rebel movements they do represent a well-armed and highly trained force, which in the near future may realistically turn its weapons against parts of the Syrian society along with US and Israeli targets in the region.

The rapidity with which the situation may deteriorate in Beirut and the rest of the country is of the greatest importance as the creation of areas outside of State (or Hezbollah) control may recreate a situation similar to the one of the early 1980s when Palestinian terrorists where able to effectively use the Lebanese territory to attack Israel.

Only this time, war-proven jihadists with training from Iraq and Afghanistan would be taking up these regions to undermine the Lebanese stability and the security of Israel. The presence of foreign fighters will only further ignite an already tense situation in a highly divided country.

The implications for Israel are clear. If none of these threats may appear as a full blown existential challenged to the Jewish State, they nevertheless do implicate a necessary change of strategic posture. Since 1973, the border with Syria has mainly been defended considering a conventional attack.

The development of safe havens for terrorist organizations deep inside Syrian territory and Lebanese hinterland will require a high state of alert in a period during which winds of war with Iran are taking a great part of the Israeli security apparatus. Israel’s medium term challenge will then be not to overstretch its home front defensive lines, from the Sinai to the Golan, while designing a strategy to successfully respond to the Iranian nuclear threat