Two States or two universes

A Personal Reflection on Israel/Palestine 1982-2006

Today almost the entire international community claims to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority have signed up to two states. So have most of their respective supporters in Australia and elsewhere. And the USA Government and the European Community have also endorsed this proposal. But the more contentious question is what type of two-state solution they actually support.

I have supported a two-state solution for over 23 years since I was caught up as a naïve seventeen year old first year university student in the ill winds and polarisation of the Lebanon War debate at Melbourne University. Desperately I sought some mid-way compromise between the  rigid anti-Zionism of much of the political Left, and the parochial pro-Israel patriotism of much of the Jewish community. After a short but intense intellectual investigation I identified two states as the only solution that would potentially meet both the minimum security needs of Israel and the minimum national aspirations of the Palestinians.[i]

For me two states has always meant simply the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign Jewish state within roughly the pre-1967 Green Line borders, and equally the right of the Palestinians to an independent state within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The precise parameters of this territorial division including the complex matter of East Jerusalem would of course need to be determined by direct negotiations between the contending parties.

For most of the period from 1982-2000 I was a complete optimist. This optimism was based (with hindsight) on the arguably simplistic assumption that only political barriers on the Israeli side prevented the implementation of the two-state solution, and also on the absence of a complementary critical analysis of Palestinian actions and agendas. Over the last five years I have in contrast become convinced that Palestinian political barriers to peace are just as significant, and perhaps more significant than those from the Israeli side. I am unfortunately now a confirmed pessimist.

My two-state position was based on both moral and practical grounds for a Palestinian state. The moral case recognized that the creation of Israel in 1948 had inflicted an overwhelming injustice upon the Palestinians. Yet as a Jew, I believed that the creation of Israel was a necessary act of affirmative action in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, and had to take precedence over opposing claims. However, I also believed that the Palestinians were entitled to at least partial compensation for the injustice of 1948 by securing a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The practical case was that a Palestinian state would inevitably emerge anyway due to a combination of internal and external pressures. Israeli and local Jewish opposition to a two-state solution was ultimately self-defeating and would only lead to ongoing bloodshed since it was ignoring the reality of Palestinian national existence and aspirations.[ii]

My support for a two-state solution included (and still includes) an implacable opposition to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on the following objections:

• They were immoral and unethical since the confiscation of Palestinian land to build settlements involved a second dispossession for Palestinians, many of whom had previously fled or been forced to leave their original homes inside Israel. Further, many of the settlers exacerbated this existing trauma by engaging in verbal and physical abuse of the Palestinian population, including some instances of violent assault and murder;
• They were a political disaster since they were planned precisely to foreclose the very possibility of a peaceful two-state solution, and their presence provoked constant conflict and violence between Palestinians and the Israeli army, and caused much unnecessary loss of life on both sides;
• They were illegal since they involved the takeover of Palestinian land by military force, and violated the legal right of the Palestinians to determine the population of their own territory;
• They were economically disastrous since they diverted resources badly needed by Jews (including many poor Jews) living inside the borders of sovereign Israel.[iii]
  

It is worth adding, however, that this critique of the settlements needs to be viewed separately from the question of legitimate Israeli military and security concerns in the Territories as an outcome of the Six Day War. The great mistake of the Israelis was to align reasonable military objectives with the contentious religious and ideological claims of the settlers movement.[iv]

The practical case for a Palestinian state was also based on some very western universalistic assumptions. I rationalized that a moderate Israeli Government willing to cede significant territory and recognize Palestinian national rights would provoke a corresponding surge of good will amongst Palestinians. In short, conflict resolution was about meeting fair and reasonable Palestinian claims, not about addressing broader and potentially irreconcilable cultural and religious narratives. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians were constructed as ordinary human beings who wanted nothing more than an end to the Israeli occupation. And the ball was in Israel’s court as the more powerful party to deliver this reasonable outcome.

The contrary argument often heard from Israeli and local Jewish conservatives was that the Palestinians held very different values, perspectives and goals.[v] It was suggested that Israeli political and territorial concessions, rather than bringing peace, would only provoke further Palestinian violence and extremism. It was easy to dismiss these views because they seemed to be based so narrowly on Israeli self-interest: that is on defending the status quo involving Israeli territorial expansionism, and the disenfranchisement of Palestinians. They also appeared to reflect paternalistic and even racist views about the Palestinians. But with hindsight, discussions about the possibility of peace need to recognize that the Palestinians employ entirely different political constructs – neither worse nor better – to the westernized Israelis. These objective differences are about culture, not about race.

For much of the intervening period at least till the 1993 Oslo Peace Accord, my two-state position was not popular in either of my two key political constituencies: the ideological Left or the Jewish community.

Many on the Left questioned the validity of Israel’s existence. Some openly argued that Israel should be destroyed irrespective of the potentially genocidal implications of this proposal. In contrast, many in the local Jewish community preferred to believe that the Palestinians did not exist. There was not a great deal of overt Australian Jewish support for the Israeli settlement movement, but equally few Jews dared to support the two-state agenda. But I saw little reason to change my beliefs.

Further events confirmed my suppositions. In 1987, the Israeli academic Benny Morris published his seminal account of the origins of the Palestinian refugee tragedy. Whilst noting that the Palestinian exodus was closely linked to the events of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Morris’s research confirmed beyond any doubt that Israeli military actions had played a key role in the exodus. This finding undoubtedly strengthened the legitimacy of Palestinian demands for an independent state. But with hindsight, Morris and his supporters including myself arguably underplayed the extent to which the exodus was a direct by-product of the Arab and Palestinian attempt to destroy the newly created State of Israel. [vi]

The 1993 Oslo Accord based on mutual compromise and concessions also seemed to confirm my view that a two-state solution was inevitable, and resulted in greater support for two states from both the mainstream of the Jewish community, and much of the political Left.

To be sure, the wave of suicide bombings by the Palestinian fundamentalist group Hamas in the 1994-96 period challenged both my optimism and some of my assumptions. A number of my contributions during this period pointed out that the willingness of the average Israeli to recognize and grant legitimate Palestinian aspirations for national independence was directly commensurate to the willingness of the Palestinian majority to eschew and actively oppose violence and terror. [vii]

But I was unwilling to consider other darker conclusions including the possibility that most Palestinians including the Palestinian Authority either approved the suicide bombings, or at least saw them as a legitimate means of securing Palestinian political objectives. Equally, the failure of the Israelis to either dismantle settlements, or to make explicit plans to do so seemed to provide an understandable smokescreen for the venting of Palestinian frustration and extremism.[viii]

However, the sad events of the second half of 2000 forced me to re-examine my core beliefs. The complex reasons behind the failure of the Camp David negotiations in July 2000 have been documented ad nauseam elsewhere.[ix] Suffice to say, that failure and the subsequent Palestinian Intifada (which is really an undeclared war against Israel) suggested that finding a reasonable balance between basic Israeli security and national requirements, and Palestinian rights to a sovereign state might prove to be difficult if not impossible.[x]

The failure to provide common ground suggests that there is a huge cultural gulf between Israeli and Palestinian concepts of peace. Israel has always viewed peace in highly western terms as the cessation of war and violence following negotiations and mutual compromise. Conflict resolution will be based on a reasonable mid-way point between the conflicting Israeli and Palestinian narratives. Peace is seen as an end in itself.

In contrast, Palestinians seem to define peace not as the absence of war per se, but rather as the restoration of their national, territorial, and political rights. This is not a tangible or concrete concept that is easily resolved via Western-style negotiations. The Palestinians view themselves as the victims of an historical wrong (the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the associated Naqba or catastrophe) which can only be resolved by the implementation of a just solution. Justice is defined in absolute rather than relative terms, and all opposing narratives are unequivocally rejected. In short, whilst a Palestinian state may be a prerequisite for peace, it is also possible to have a Palestinian state and a continued state of war.

The ongoing problem is that all two-state proposals, whether at Camp David or at Taba in January 2001 or the unofficial 2003 Geneva Accord,[xi] are based on the assumption that the Palestinians both want to make a compromise deal with Israel, and will honour such a deal. But the above analysis suggests that the absolutist nature of Palestinian political culture may preclude any such deal. Hence even in the unlikely circumstance that Israel did offer a full withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, there is a fair chance that the Palestinians would reject the offer because they cannot reconcile themselves with the continued existence of Israel.

Summary of Barriers to Peace

It is arguable that the following factors are likely to prevent implementation of a two-state solution. On the Palestinian side:

1. Their priority is to achieve justice based exclusively on their core narrative. Resolving the conflict is only a secondary goal to this end;
2. Continued demands for a literal rather than symbolic Right of Return of 1948 refugees to Green Line Israel, rather than to the Palestinian Territories. Even the relatively moderate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has assured Palestinians that the 1948 refugees will eventually gain their rights and the day will come when the refugees return home”.[xii] Yet two states and a right of return are a complete contradiction in terms.[xiii]
3. All Palestinian factions including the secular Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade which is associated with the ruling Fatah faction are engaged in ongoing forms of violence and terrorism against Israeli civilians, principally within the Green Line borders. For many Palestinians, violence based on a combination of religious and national fundamentalism seems to be their primary form of political expression. This violence provides Israel with a constant excuse to take any forms of military action within the Territories on the alleged grounds of self-defence.[xiv]
   

On the Israeli side:

1. There is a strong Israeli consensus that for security purposes they need to preserve the existing balance of military power and control vis-à-vis Palestinians, particularly around the control of borders. This control would almost certainly preclude the establishment of genuine Palestinian sovereignty;
2. The current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has acknowledged that the Palestinians have a right to “a national sovereign existence in a state of their own”.[xv] But even the most generous interpretation of Sharon’s long-term intentions would suggest that Israel will retain control of the large settlement blocs in the West Bank, and so prevent the emergence of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state;
3. Even if an Israeli Prime Minister did decide to withdraw from all the West Bank settlements, it is difficult in practice to see how the large settlement blocs could be dismantled. There are currently 230,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank including the cities of Ariel and Ma’ale Adunim which both have a population of more than 20,000 people. [xvi] Yet retention of the settlements involves a blurring between Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence, and illegitimate demands for territorial expansion and ethnic domination.
   

Conclusion

We have now almost regressed back to the hopeless scenario that preceded the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Israeli Left is once again trying with little success to persuade the centrist majority that a two-state solution will enhance rather than undermine long-term Israeli security. But most Israelis appear to see the experience of Palestinian violence and extremism over the past 12 years as evidence that Israeli political and territorial concessions do not bring peace.

Conversely, the Palestinians still seem to be demanding a maximal rather than minimal implementation of their national demands, whilst in practice doing nothing either in their rhetoric or actions to provide a positive vision of what a future Palestinian state might look like.

The most likely direction is that Israeli actions will remain largely reactive to the veto power of Palestinian violence as typified by the security fence, and unilateral in terms of securing short-term self-interest as typified by the disengagement from Gaza. Otherwise all Israeli governments whatever their ideological disposition are likely to wait for a long-term change in Palestinian political culture that is more accommodating to mutual compromise.

(Dr Philip Mendes is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Social Work at Monash University. He is the author or co-author of five books including Jews and Australian Politics, Sussex Academic Press, 2004: Philip.Mendes@med.monash.edu.au)

[i] Mendes, P. 1997, ‘Teenage Memories of Israel, Zionism and Palestinian Refugees’, Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal, vol.14, no.1, pp.130-135.
[ii] See also Mendes, P. 2000, ‘Two States of Crisis’, Arena Magazine, 50, p.8.
[iii] Mendes, P. 2002, ‘In two minds’, Eureka Street, vol.12, no.1, pp.8-9; Alpher, Y. 2005, ‘The settlers’ mistakes’, Bitterlemons Newsletter, No.33 (Online), Available: www.bitterlemons.org (2005, September 12).
[iv] Walzer, Michael. 2002, ‘The four wars of Israel/Palestine’, Dissent, vol.49, no.4, pp.26-33.
[v] Levin, K. 2005, The Oslo Syndrome, Smith and Kraus, Hanover, pp.280-281.
[vi] The second edition of Morris’s book highlights the importance of this broader context. See Morris, B. 2004, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.7.
[vii] Mendes, P. 1995, ‘And Another Thing’, Arena Magazine, no.17, p.17.
[viii] Mendes, P. 1995, ‘Rabin’s Plans’, Australian Jewish News, 24 February.
[ix] Mendes, P. 2005, ‘Israel’s camp david peace proposal: generous offer or sham?’ AQ, vol.76, no.1, pp.14-17.
[x] Mendes, P. 2002, ‘A leftist’s pessimism for a two-state solution’, Australian Jewish News, 8 November.
[xi] Beilin, Y. 2004, The Path to Geneva: The quest for a permanent agreement, 1996-2004, RDV Books, New York, pp.326-361.
[xii] MacKinnon, I. 2004, ‘Leader knows refugees’ right of return is only symbolic’, The Australian, 10 January.
[xiii] Mendes, P. 2004, ‘Wishful Thinking and the Palestinian Right of Return’, Jewish Currents, vol.58, no.2, pp.6-7.
[xiv] Mendes, P. 2003, ‘Suicide Bombings: Oppression is no Justification’, Jewish Currents, vol.57, no.5, pp.6-7.
[xv] Rabinovich, A. 2005, ‘Sharon opens his heart to peace with Palestinians’, The Australian, 17 September.
[xvi] Tilley, V. 2005, The One-State Solution, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp.19-27. Whilst I disagree strongly with the premise of Tilley’s book, her arguments regarding the likely permanence of the key settlement blocs seem difficult to challenge.