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A weakening Leader

Three months after Mahmud Abbas became leader of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the results are disappointing. True, he faces a difficult job. True he is following the safest strategy. But all that matters now are results.

With results, Abbas can use his popular mandate, international support, and Israeli flexibility to reorganize the PA, mobilize Fatah, turn his people toward peace, and make a success story in the Gaza Strip.

Certainly, Abbas's big achievement is the ceasefire, but it was gained because almost all forces on the Palestinian side were exhausted and ready for a break. Having lost the war, they were happy to end it, at least until the next time violence seems appealing.

Again, Abbas's strategy does make sense. He faces three serious oppositions: Islamists (mainly Hamas), Fatah insurgents (the al-Aqsa Brigades), and Fatah hardliners (many of his own colleagues). But his policy of appeasing them will make his job tougher. Perhaps it is already too late for him to change course and emerge powerful and triumphant.

Instead, he too often imitates Yasir Arafat's old approach. Make an announcement--condemning terrorism, warning extremists, denouncing corruption or calling for reforming the security forces--and then doing nothing.

Blaming this on Israel is going to be hard. The Israeli government has released prisoners, wants to turn over West Bank towns, supports the PA getting more money, has stopped pursuing wanted men, and is ready to leave the Gaza Strip. About all Israel can be accurately accused of is building some new settlement housing in very limited areas of the West Bank.

Let's review all the issues in depth and see how the new Palestinian leadership stands.

Ceasefire: Abbas has helped persuade Palestinian factions of agreeing to a ceasefire with Israel. But much of the credit goes to effective Israeli security measures as well to the self-interest of Palestinian groups badly weakened by defeats in their recent war against Israel.

Fighting lawlessness and disarming militants: Without structural changes, however, the ceasefire could end at any time. Abbas wants to integrate last week's terrorists into the security forces, but such a step would undermine the reliability of his own armed men. Arrogant militia leaders escalate their financial and other demands. When these are not met, they riot and shoot at whomever they want, including high PA officials. No one is arrested or punished.

In this context, who will gain popular credit when Israel turns over the whole Gaza Strip to the PA, Abbas or the gunmen? Will PA security forces be ready to face down the militias and really take control of all this territory in order to govern it?

Reforming security forces: One or two incompetent and dishonest commanders have been removed but no real step has been taken toward restructuring the security forces or ensuring their discipline.

Weapons' smuggling: Some attempts have been made to reduce bringing arms across the border but munitions are still coming in, many of them delivered to Abbas's enemies.

Corruption: A small number of offenders are being investigated or threatened with prosecution but for most it is business as usual.

Incitement: A decline in calls for immediate attacks on Jews and support for the ceasefire are short-term improvements. But continued insistence on the illegitimacy of Israel, its future destruction, and the extolling of violence bodes ill. Weekly sermons of clerics appointed and paid by the PA still include blood-curdling hatred of Jews and Americans.

Rebuilding Fatah: With elections due in July--and especially now that Hamas is running candidates--revitalizing Fatah should be an all-out top priority. Yet despite talk about this necessity, the level of passivity is incredible. Fatah is headed for a disaster both in terms of its internal unity and its appeal to the people as a whole.

Gaining control over Fatah insurgents and Islamists: Abbas has talked to a lot of people but has made zero progress on both of these fronts.

Winning personal support from the Arab world: Abbas has not gotten strong endorsements or backing from Arab rulers, at least aside from Egypt. This is a big failure especially since success here might not have been so difficult.

Again, the new leadership's task is difficult. Taking strong action against the hardliners, criminals, and terrorists would provoke a strong reaction from those targeted. Yet absent in the Palestinian leadership's calculations is any attempt to appeal over the heads of the militants to the masses.

Where are the ringing speeches in which Abbas could say, "Yes, I arrested 200 people on corruption charges and seized Hamas' weapons stockpiles but I did it to ensure that bullies would not shoot up your streets, demand protection money and steal bread out of your mouths".

Where is the new vision of the Palestinian future about which Abbas could say, "The time has come to make peace with Israel and end the conflict forever. Getting an independent Palestinian state where we can live in peace and happiness is worth giving up our claim to the rest of the land."

Failing to fight corruption and anarchy or take the steps needed to get Israel to relinquish West Bank towns is going to lose the chance to mobilize popular support behind the new leader.

Yes, it is easy to answer that Abbas has taken the safer road and avoided risks. Yet rejecting both any hint of confrontation now and failing to consolidate power vigorously only ensures there will be a confrontation later in which he fights from a position of weakness.


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