History Holds Its Breath

It′s a picnic on a volcano. Mount Etna has been erupting off and on for over 2 million years, and that′s just about how it feels in the Middle East with the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Beneath the current calm, the lava boils, and a half-attentive world is deluded into thinking peace is finally on the way, following the death of the destructive Yasser Arafat and the election of the "constructive" Abu Mazen.

Keep the champagne in the picnic basket. Nothing has changed. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, is a weak leader on all fronts. The changes he has made are only nominal. He runs the same Palestinian Authority with post-Arafat diplomacy resting on the old Arafat bureaucracy, from the per-sonal assistants within the chairman′s office to the Arafat old-timers running many of the ministries. Failure to end the Palestinian Authority′s endemic corruption has so alienated the younger echelons of Fatah that the deputy speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hassan Harisha, and the head of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Raji Sourani, have both publicly expressed disappointment that Abu Mazen has neither removed the dishonest bureaucrats from the organization nor restored law and order by transforming the security forces.

Third intifada. This latter failure is the smoke and ash that should alert the world to the impending danger. The officers of the dozen or so Palestinian security agencies are virtually local warlords who continue to collect bribes and protection money from the people they′re supposed to be protecting. Their commanders follow Abu Mazen′s orders only when they feel like it. The result is continuing disorder in Palestinian cities. Gunmen shoot at will--recently, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades opened fire on the very restaurants frequented by Palestinian Authority officials in Ramallah. These same thugs have thumbed their noses at Abu Mazen′s order not to appear in public with weapons. Marauding gangs of Fatah-affiliated gunmen remain unchecked. Wanted men roam freely in Ramallah and Jenin; Abu Mazen does nothing to stop them. He promised Israel he would disarm 495 fugitives and killers on Israel′s most-wanted list, remove them from their terrorist organizations, and restrict their intercity travel. He has not done any of it. Instead, he has allowed them to enter the cities turned over to the Palestinian Authority, places like Tulkarm and Jericho, because these cities became safe havens once the Israelis agreed not to enter them. Israeli intelligence has concluded that these terrorists are planning attacks for the next round of violence--in effect, a third intifada. Other than dismissing a group of aging generals, without changing the orders not to fire on the terrorists, and speaking out against terrorist violence as a tactical rather than a moral matter, the only thing Abu Mazen has accomplished is to execute dozens of Palestinians who were helping the Israelis root out Palestinian terrorists. No less a dove than Shlomo Ben-Ami, Ehud Barak′s foreign minister, has written that Abu Mazen "is moderate in his strategy, not his goals, which are no different from Arafat′s goals."

Abu Mazen′s commitment to disarm Hamas and Islamic Jihad has become a bad joke. Not only has he assured Hamas members that they can keep their weapons, but he has, fatefully, allowed them to participate in the political process--even with their guns! His wooing of Hamas as a political party avoided bloodshed but enhanced its legitimacy without diminishing its arsenal or capacity for violence, giving the organization an effective veto on peace negotiations.

The landscape is as menacing as it is bleak. Abbas has failed to close the rocket and explosives factories; he has not arrested any key operatives; he has been unable to gain support for a cease-fire, or hudna, accepting a lesser obligation of tahadiya, or calm, which is no more than a pause to rearm, train, and reload. And that is already happening. Abu Mazen has not stopped attacks or punished those who have committed them, or put a stop to the escalating weapons smuggling from Egypt, abetted by some of his own officials. The firing of mortars and Kassam rockets in Gaza is another violation of the understanding with Israel, but it continues. Abu Mazen no longer goes there to condemn or stop the attacks but, in fact, justifies them.

Terrorist groups are now making great efforts to smuggle expertise and weapons into the West Bank, which is where the Israelis expect the next attacks, after the disengagement from Gaza--attacks that are just waiting for execution orders. In some instances, when Israel provided the Palestinian Authority with the names of weapons smugglers, Palestinian security officials warned the smugglers that the Israelis were on their tail. Abu Mazen has not even been willing to eliminate the odious incitement in Palestinian media to hatred of Jews and Israelis--never mind silencing the imams inciting violence. Astonishingly, he has even allowed the introduction into high schools of the infamous anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Palestinian spokespeople in the West deny this insidious poisoning of the next generation, but it is a fact, as is the failure of Palestinian school texts to recognize the existence of Israel.

The Palestinian leadership always acts differently than it speaks. Arafat always said different things in Arabic than he did in English--and Abu Mazen upholds the tradition. He utters words to condemn terrorist acts, but they mean nothing as long as he refuses to dismantle the terrorist organizations that have brought every hope of progress into question. His failure on the security issue is so pronounced that he has been forced to delay his planned trip to meet with President Bush. The judgment that Abu Mazen is doing little is widespread, even among Palestinians. He is not trusted, even by his own people.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon′s initiative to unilaterally disengage from Gaza and parts of the West Bank created a unique opportunity for improving Palestinian-Israeli relations by addressing the psychological blocks that have, until now, proved insurmountable for improved ties--namely, the Palestinian belief that Israel would never relinquish control over occupied territories and the Israeli belief that the Palestinians would never renounce terrorism.

Dismantling the settlements illustrates Israel′s willingness to make painful concessions for peace. But Palestinian reciprocity is essential. Israel stands ready to release more prisoners, transfer more cities to Palestinian control, and lift more roadblocks, but it is unable to do all this without Palestinian efforts to enter into serious coordination with Israel. How can the disengagement be peaceable? What is the equitable way of transferring the infrastructure the Israelis have built up in Gaza, from utilities and agribusiness to greenhouses and homes?

Perils. The danger is that Palestinian terrorists will increase their activity during the implementation phase of disengagement, in order to suggest that the Israeli withdrawal is the result of terrorist pressure. The Palestinian Authority must demonstrate an ability to prevent these attacks and pursue those who perpetrate them or else the Israelis will be forced to respond in a way that may preclude further progress.

Until Abu Mazen can move beyond Arafat′s legacy by reforming his government and rebuilding the security services, his attempt to build a moderate image abroad will fail, and no peace plan will be meaningful.

Dangerously, the Fatah movement has grown so weak and fractured that its political efforts for Legislative Council elections in July have virtually collapsed. The beneficiaries have been Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whose public support in polls now exceeds 50 percent, dominating that of Fatah, which is under 15 percent. Should Hamas emerge with a majority in the Legislative Council, the conflict will become even more dire, for as the Hamas leader Khaled Mashal said, "The lull for Hamas is a tactic of resistance, while for the PA, it′s an alternative to resistance."

What happens if the leaders of Hamas assume key positions in the legislative and executive branches while still advocating jihad and the destruction of Israel? Nothing but more bloodshed. Everything could be lost for another generation if the new government is dominated by Hamas.

Sharon, on the other hand, is in a trap. To respond is to risk being accused of sabotaging the relative calm. To fail to respond is to enhance the terrorist risk to Israel. The only thing Israel can do is to refuse to lift some roadblocks that would expand the freedom of movement of Palestinians--a move that would provoke the usual outcry from those oblivious to facts on the ground.

Abu Mazen has succeeded in part in shifting the onus from the Palestinians to the Israelis because he is careful what he tells the Palestinian public. They do not know of his promise to disarm the 495 suspects on Israel′s most-wanted list, any more than they know about the generous settlement terms the Israelis proposed at Camp David five years ago. So they believe that the Palestinian Authority has fulfilled its obligations and the Israelis are failing in theirs.

Western leaders must not repeat the mistakes of earlier administrations by failing to hold the Palestinians accountable. They must link at least a portion of their financial support to ending terrorism and incitement and to introducing genuine democratic reforms. This will require Lt. Gen. William Ward, the U.S. security adviser, to take a more proactive role. Washington must also press those Arab countries whose bank accounts are overflowing from high oil prices to increase funding for the Palestinian economy. They haven′t even kept their minimum promises of economic help.

The Palestinians cannot be allowed the indulgence of believing they can get away with empty rhetoric and unfilled promises without following through to end corruption and terrorism. Mahmoud Abbas, so far, has been a partner for peace in words alone. This will not endure.

The next 100 days will determine the fate of the peace process and tell us whether there is any chance for stability in the region. To succeed, Abu Mazen must prevent violence before and after disengagement and take control of the land and property in Gaza in an orderly way. This will require leadership and the stature to make tough decisions and implement them, qualities not yet visible in Abu Mazen, whose real friends live not in Ramallah but Washington. The danger is not only that Abbas may be Arafat in a suit; it is that he may be Arafat in an empty suit. That would be the worst of all outcomes.