The biggest question posed by the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya is what does it mean for the future of the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad? Picture: AP Source: AP
THE Germs of Syria would like to congratulate the Rats of Libya.
This, surely, is one of the most splendid and brilliant expressions of solidarity among rebels in the course, so far, of the Arab Spring. It reflects the justifiable pride of the rebels in the labels their dictators have given them.
The Libyan revolution could still end a thousand different ways. But the Germs and the Rats are intensely connected. The biggest strategic question posed by the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya is what does it mean for the future of the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad? Libya is important but Syria could be critical. Its population is three times as big as Libya's, it is located in the strategic pivot of the Middle East and it is Iran's most important ally.
The events in Libya help the rebels in Syria. The Middle East revolutions are spreading by contagion. Young people watch the demonstrations in each others' cities and take inspiration from each others' courage.
This even had an echo in Israel, which of course is a stable democracy and had orderly demonstrations about normal political issues, and in Britain, which experienced nihilist street looting. But without equating the motives or behaviour of the different demonstrators, for countless young people there was a feeling that the street was the place to be.
Some Western analysts believe the demise of Gaddafi's rule may encourage Assad to embrace a grand bargain, encompassing his resignation. If he does not, he will likely be indicted eventually by the International Criminal Court. Then he would have nowhere to go, trapped inside his nation, and not very secure there. If he leaves before that he could negotiate no prosecution and affluent exile.
The European Union is moving to ratchet up sanctions against Syria's already crippled economy. Assad has lost the support, critically, of his giant neighbour, Turkey, which is concerned with the public relations disaster of Assad's crackdowns, the outflow of refugees from Syria to Turkey and the potential for Syria's substantial Kurdish minority to hook up with their Turkish cousins.
On the other hand, Assad is in some ways in an inherently stronger position than Gaddafi. It is highly unlikely that NATO would risk another military intervention in an Arab country and Assad, like everyone else, knows the Libyan rebels would not have prevailed without NATO airpower.
Moreover, Assad remains tight with Iran, so he will never be wholly isolated.
Partisans of Barack Obama are praising his masterful inactivity on both Libya and Syria. In truth, the US President has looked irrelevant and more or less impotent in the whole drama of the Arab Spring, but nonetheless he probably took the right policy options on Libya. He did enough to support the British and French desire, with strong backing from Australia's Kevin Rudd, to intervene in Libya, but made sure there was no suggestion of Western troops on the ground.
The Libyans will own the outcome in their own country. The most important consideration for the West, in Syria and Libya, and indeed in Egypt and Tunisia, is not that these countries become pro-Western, which, given the paranoia that characterises all Arab political culture, is pretty much inconceivable. It is rather that they become successful, peaceful, self-directed societies, pursuing economic development, at peace with their neighbours and not actively at war with the West. If that means that their local leaders engage in a bit of Islamo-waffle and even rhetorical US-bashing, so long as it's relatively moderate, that would be a reasonable outcome.
One of the many problems with Iraq and Afghanistan was that their governments owed everything, even their existence, to Washington. This provided a political equation almost impossible for them to manage.
Obama has been even more cautious about Syria than he was about Libya, or indeed Egypt or Tunisia. It took him months to finally come to the conclusion that he should call for Assad to step down as Syria's leader, yet he reached that position about Hosni Mubarak, a much more liberal, less bloody and US-friendly dictator, within weeks.
Why were the Americans so cautious about Syria?
Well informed sources suggest several reasons. One was the understandable if extreme caution about becoming too involved in too many conflicts in the Middle East. Another was a very serious concern about the influence of Al-Qa'ida affiliates and more general Islamist extremists in the Syrian opposition.
This was a worry in Libya, too. Western intelligence analysts believe al-Qa'ida affiliates are pretty marginal in the Libyan opposition. However, historically al-Qa'ida did have significant success in recruiting, especially from eastern Libya. Broader-based Islamist extremists, the Muslim Brotherhood and others, are a bigger problem in Libya. Israeli sources suggest that some of the advanced weaponry flooding into the Gaza Strip recently has come from Libyan sources, which would be an extreme concern for Western policy-makers.
Within Syria, the al-Qa'ida-linked element is greater and the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood is also greater. The risks and uncertainties of a post-Assad Syria are very troublesome.
And Assad, for all his brutality, and all the trouble he has caused in Lebanon, has kept his border with Israel essentially stable. But it would be utterly wrong for the West to take the view that the stability of dictatorship is all that can ever be hoped for.
Further, there are potentially serious strategic gains from toppling Assad.
It would be a huge blow to Iran's position in the region. Syria is ruled by the minority Alawite sect, which is a branch of Shia Islam. A post-Assad Syria would almost certainly reflect the dominance of its Sunni majority. This would make it unlikely to re-enter an alliance with Iran. It would also make it less likely to continue sponsoring the Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, which has effectively taken a dominant position in the Lebanese government and which, with its massive missile stockpile, is always threatening renewed conflict with Israel.
The Alawite dominance of the Syrian army would surely disappear and this would make that army less effective, and less of a regional threat, at least for a time.
While there are immense risks, it's in the West's interests for Assad to go.
Gaddafi's going makes that more likely.
