On Saturday a blast killed an Iranian general connected to the development of surface-to-surface missiles, and on Sunday Iran admitted being on the receiving end of a new cyber attack.
Beyond the delay in the program, causing direct failures by an "invisible hand" has a psychological effect. It sends a message to Iran that its plan is breached and accessible. This may instil doubt and make Iran believe that any equipment malfunction is due to external intervention.
Leaks of information on the subject also contribute significantly to Iranian "paranoia", as much as actual sabotage would, and may also create friction between those in charge of development and the Iranian regime.
Covert activity may weaken Iran's determination; exact a high price from it, and signal that it had better moderate its positions. Indeed, covert activity increases the pressure on Iran in comparison with sanctions, while avoiding the price that a military attack on the nuclear facilities may incur.
Perhaps in the perspective of the Americans, who are reportedly leading this campaign, this strategy buys precious time, allows sanctions to work, and may encourage decision-makers in Israel not to rush to other options.
And for those who would avoid military action, covert activity can heighten the pressure on Iran, while enabling preparation of political and economic solutions to the nuclear challenge.
Having said that, external intervention, especially if carried out on a wide scale, can increase Iran's determination to achieve a nuclear capability. In general, it is not clear whether Western intelligence agencies possess the capabilities to lead a campaign of sufficient magnitude that can reach the desired end, which is to influence the Iranian motivation.
Moreover, a small action gone wrong can cause considerable political damage and harm the entire effort. It has been reported that the Iranian attempt on the life of the Saudi ambassador to the US was a retaliation to ongoing covert operations in Iran.
Furthermore, one could ask whether covert activity actually hinders Iran's progress. Perhaps those failures that are now stalling Iran's nuclear program have caused negligible impact compared to the scope of the Iranian project. Iran has built a broad-based nuclear infrastructure with redundancy, dispersal, and protection in a variety of sites - open and hidden, civilian and military.
Meanwhile, the program's "immunity" to military action increases as time passes. This is mainly thanks to improvements in active and passive defence of the different sites. In this situation - when the chances of a military strike are high and costly - these kind of counter-proliferation activities become a more significant tool to assist in delaying the Iranian nuclear program.
Beyond the ability to delay and disrupt any progress, this course of action exacts a considerable price from the Iranian regime - without hurting the Iranian people - and it may, in the eyes of those who still believe in the idea of engagement, "convince" Iran to return to the negotiating table and moderate its position.
It seems as if the West has yet to decide on the price it is willing to inflict on Iran to prevent it from crossing the nuclear threshold.
Effective covert actions may extend the distance Iran will have to cross until reaching the threshold and provide decision-makers with precious time to consider other courses of action.
It is not a magic solution - there is no magic solution. It is most sufficient combining it with political and economic measures.
Sabotage on an industrial scale can influence Tehran considerations in regards to if and when to "break out" or "sneak out" towards a military nuclear capability. But it will stick to its policy if it assumes the road to completing it is not long, and the price it may have to pay is not overly high.
Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and a former member of Israel's National Security Council
