A DISTANT sponsor finances the war among the olive groves and walnut trees high on the Jebel Akrad mountains. Sometimes he supplies the rebel fighters there with weapons and ammunition. More often he gives them money, hundreds of thousands of Syrian pounds, that are carried along hidden trails by a courier coming from Turkey.
With the sponsor's support, the rebels can raid, harry and ambush the logistic routes and outposts of the Syrian army in the valley beneath them. Without it, the hundred men of the Thwar Tahrir khattiba (brigade), one of a dozen rebel units in the area, would be little more than desperate renegades struggling to survive.
There is one major problem in the relationship. The rebels do not know who their sponsor is.
"We know what we are fighting against, but we don't know exactly who we are fighting for," admitted the khattiba's commander, Lieutenant Ahmad, a tall athletic man in his mid-20s who was an infantry officer in the Syrian army before defecting seven months ago to join the rebel Free Syrian Army. "A middleman in Turkey masks the sponsor's identity. We can never deal with him directly. At the moment there are no conditions to the money and weapons we receive, but I'm worried that one day there might be."
His concerns epitomise fears shared by numerous opposition elements inside Syria, as well as Western powers and the wider international community.
The influx of weapons and money to rebel fighters has increased the tempo of fighting, bringing clashes to the streets of Damascus and widening the conflict throughout Syria to the point that the International Committee of the Red Cross has termed the revolution a civil war.
There are strong moral arguments for arming the rebels and ending President Bashar al-Assad's regime, but who exactly is financing the revolution and what is their agenda?
Syria's revolution is expensive. In just a few months of fighting, Lieutenant Ahmad has learnt how high the financial costs can be. In the valley beneath us, clearly visible in the light of late afternoon, a Syrian army unit staffs a heavily fortified post on the highway leading southwest to the city of Lattakia. A fortnight ago, Lieutenant Ahmad led 70 men in a night raid on the post, killing 14 Syrian soldiers and leaving two armoured BMP fighting vehicles aflame. "We hit them hard, but it cost a lot," he admitted, cradling a Polish Kalashnikov as he looked down at the Syrian post. Rumbles of artillery echoed in the distance and smoke from burning forests smeared the horizon.
"In just an hour of fighting we used 3000 rounds of ammunition and 15 RPGs. At $US2 ($1.94) a bullet and about $US1000 for an RPG, that's about $US21,000 at current prices. Now, until the next payment of money arrives, we are restricted to defending ourselves."
Lieutenant Ahmad founded the khattiba three months ago, uniting smaller ad hoc FSA groups from villages on the Jebel Akrad, a strategic mountain range above the main road linking Lattakia with the interior.
"Weapons and munitions were my first big problem," he said. "We didn't have enough of anything. But money is an issue too. It costs 96,000 Syrian pounds every 10 days just to feed my khattiba."
Soon after forming his unit, Lieutenant Ahmad was approached by a Syrian businessman living in Turkey, who offered to act as a wasta, a go-between on behalf of a mysterious sponsor.
Lieutenant Ahmad agreed, but not all his fighters were happy. Some, including Lieutenant Ahmad's elder brother, Mohammed, knew the businessman by reputation as a black marketeer and warned against involvement with him. "The wasta is a crook," Mohammed said. "He makes money out of us with false accounting for our ammunition expenditure and keeps cash for himself.
"Each khattiba here has similar problems with their middlemen, but ours is the worst." The first sum of cash duly arrived, with a computer and Chinese radios.
Then came the weapons: AK47s and RPGs smuggled in via Turkey from Libya and Iraq. More money followed, usually Syrian currency but sometimes US dollars. The largest single tranche to the khattiba in the past three months was 1.5 million Syrian pounds. The sum was a little more than the amount needed for a night raid.
Lieutenant Ahmad and his rebels remained uneasy. "The middleman's accounts are deliberately chaotic so that he can take money for himself," he said.
"And the equipment is often not as it should be. We asked for good boots. The middleman bought them using the sponsor's money. They were Chinese. They fell apart after 10 days. I'm sure the wasta charges the sponsor for high-quality equipment, and keeps the cash difference."
Later, a Syrian activist who knew the middleman told me the man was based in the southern Turkish city of Antakya and acquired weapons and money through a second Syrian businessman, a former dentist with close business ties to Saudi Arabia. After that, the trail goes cold. Is it official Saudi support coming in through Syrian go-betweens, or that of a private donor, Salafists or the Muslim Brotherhood?
"I don't know the answer," said Lieutenant Ahmad. "It would be much better if the sponsor dealt with us directly, or else through an official central committee run by the FSA. At least then we would have some form of transparency and end the deception.